The biological origins of religious hyper-offense-taking: Implications for the new atheists discourse. more

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  The biological origins of religious hyper-offense-taking: Implications for the new atheists discourse. Haydon P. Mort Federal University of Pernambuco, Department of Geology, Cidade Universitária, 50.740-530, Recife – PE, Brazil h.mort@btinternet.com Submitted to Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 22nd February 2010 Abstract This article summarizes recent advancements regarding the neurology of offense-taking, and assesses how this understanding impacts the highly vocal war of ideas currently being fought between atheists and theists. The differences in approach to religious criticism within the current atheist movement are outlined by assessing the stance of four of the most prominent critics of religion; Richard Dawkins, Daniel C. Dennett, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens. The efficacy of each mode of criticism is discussed within a biological and social-psychological framework. A simple model is offered which demonstrates that blanket critiques of religion will very likely increase polarization, hostility and religious convictions within religious groups. Alternative approaches are offered which may enhance the acceptability of religious activities within society. The atheistic response to Islamic fundamentalism is briefly discussed. Keywords: atheism; religion; offense; neurology; social-psychology   1 27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  1. Introduction On the 29th October 2009, the United Nations approved a draft resolution, originally motioned by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan that condemns defamation of religion as a human rights violation. Zamir Akram, the Pakistani representative tried to reassure those concerned by saying that this ‘did not mean that they opposed freedom of expression; it merely meant that there was a level at which such expression led to incitement.’ (UNOG, 2009). Such as statement is eminently sensible and echoes John Stewart Mills assertion that freedom of expression is often limited by the situation in which an opinion is expressed (Mill, 1859). However, the level at which violence is triggered due to acts such as blasphemy, is arbitrarily set by the person(s) blasphemed against and, it would appear from western standards, set rather low for most people with strong religious convictions. As part of its justification for promoting the UN resolution the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) expressed ‘deep concern [regarding] the serious instances of intolerance…within political circles, public opinion [and] negative projection[s] of certain religions in the media.’ (UNOG, 2009). The political references may be references to the recent advances of openly anti-Islamic European political parties such as the UK’s British National Party (BNP), The Netherlands’ Party of Freedom (PVV) and Switzerland’s Swiss Peoples Party (SVP). Negative projections in the media may refer to sympathetic commentaries regarding these political movements as well as the socalled new atheist movement. It has been pointed out by the latter movement that the majority of religious adherents become offended by criticism beyond what would normally be expected in rational discourse. Responding to claims from religious apologists that his book, ‘The God Delusion’ (Dawkins 2006) was ‘shrill and aggressive’, Richard Dawkins counters that his writing style was far less aggressive to that which you would expect   2 53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  to find in a newspapers restaurant review section. In a discussion between the four most prominent figures of the new atheists movement, Sam Harris stated ‘I think our criticism [of religion] is more barbed [than we appreciate] in that we are offending people but we are also telling them that they are wrong to be offended’ (RDFRS, 2007). Be that as it may, the fact remains people are frequently offended, and greatly so, by criticism of their faith. This is especially true for the vast majority of people without the sophisticated theological epistemology necessary to attempt a defence of their faith. In a world with a growing vocal religious – secular divide it is becoming urgent that we understand the origins of religious hyper-offense-taking in order to construct the framework for a stable and peaceful dialogue between those of faith and those without. 2. Biology of religious offense-taking 2.1. Neurology When two streams of conflicting information come to our attention this result is cognitive dissonance (van Veen et al., 2009). It is also known that individuals differ in their extent to which they respond negatively to uncertainty and that this is at least in part due to brain structure (Paus et al 1996; Hirsh and Inzlicht, 2008). fMRI studies show that the area of the brain responsible for handling cognitive dissonance, as well as emotional processing, the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC; Fig 1), is less active in religious people (Paus, 2001; Inzlicht et al, 2009). The result of this means that the response to uncertainty and contradictory information is muted, deflecting attention away from inconsistencies, creating confirmation bias’ and thus strengthening preconceived convictions (Inzlicht et al, 2009). However, due to this lower background ACC firing, these individuals are also more sensitive to direct   3 79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  100  101  102  103  104  personal uncertainty threats. McGregor et al, (2008) demonstrated that academic uncertainty manipulation tests actually heighten religious conviction and even a belief in the concept of holy war. This feedback mechanism works against criticism creating a certain level of neuropsychological equilibrium in the brain. The ACC activation has a strong negative correlation with amygdale activity suggesting the suppression of serotonin and dopamine uptake is the cause of negative moods during cognitive dissonance (Devinsky et al, 1995; Riedel et al., 2002; Quirk and Beer 2006; Mitchell and Phillips, 2007). Confrontational criticism of religion or faith therefore causes uncomfortable biochemical changes in brain of a believer. The higher the degree of conflicting information, the higher the level of ACC firing. Someone who has invested years of time and money undertaking religious practices would have constructed a neurophysiological framework that reflects this. Thus statements such as ‘there is no evidence for God’ or ‘religion is man-made and false’ jar so heavily within the ACC, it would seem reasonable to conclude that it is large falls in serotonin that cause the behaviour of defensiveness and hyper-offense-taking. In contrast Harris et al. (2009b) found that the process of rejecting ‘blasphemous’ statements actually increased dopamine receptor uptake. The authors concluded, therefore, that the process of rejecting a statement that conflicts with a given belief may actually make the believer feel good about do so. Another consequence of lower baseline ACC activity is the desire to avoid uncertainly in order to reduce cognitive dissonance. This would result in seeking a systematic approach to arranging thoughts and beliefs about the world that are internally consistent and/or familiar (Baron-Cohen, 2006; Murphey et al., 2006). A religion offers structure, certainty and absolute answers to important philosophical and moral questions. This framework minimizes negative perturbations within the limbic system, creating a higher overall degree of contentment within the believer.   4 105  106  107  108  109  110  111  112  113  114  115  116  117  118  119  120  121  122  123  124  125  126  127  128  129  130  2.2 Religion as a natural phenomenon Proponents of studying religion as a natural phenomenon argue our evolution as a species may have genetically predisposed humans to believing in superstitious and paranormal claims (e.g. Dennett 2006 for detailed overview). Homo sapiens lived an died in relatively arduous conditions for 95% of their existence. In such circumstances, it is argued, those who people with a neurological propensity to superstitious belief and the placebo affect would have had a statistically higher chance of survival due to a better overall morale, which research has shown significantly aids the immune system (e.g. Barak, 2006, Singh, 2009). A happier person who lives longer has a higher chance of reproducing. Therefore, over hundreds of generations the gene pool would trend towards those who had neurological predisposition to metaphysical forms of belief. As cultural memes develop and interact, the scaffolding of organized religion emerged creating in-group solidarity, which is a powerful behavioural reinforcing agent (Sosis and Alcorta, 2003). Another central part of human evolution that probably generated tendencies to gravitate towards metaphysical belief systems was the enlargement of the prefrontal cortex, a key feature that separates Homo sapiens from Neanderthals (Balsters, et al 2009; Christoff, 2009). This expansion allowed for a greater working-memory capacity and higher degrees of awareness. It is during this period of cognitive development that concepts such as infinity, zero and ‘why are we here?’ probably became meaningful and worthy of contemplation (Nieder, 2009). Such introspective questions probably lead to a further expansion in the neural networks associated with reasoning, contemplation and pattern recognition. Those who undertook such activities would have a selective advantage over those who did not, as the same expanded neurophysiology could be employed to detect patterns and solve problems   5 131  132  133  134  135  136  137  138  139  140  141  142  143  144  145  146  147  148  149  150  151  152  153  154  155  156  within a given environment. Given this advantage, excising the prefrontal cortex in this way would create reward pathways with the limbic system generating pleasurable sensations when conducting activities such as introspection, contemplation and meditation (Armstrong, 1991; Blum, et al 2009; Harris, 2009). The combined affect of such an evolution is that Homo sapiens are not entirely rational. This claim is supported by studies that show children without a religious upbringing and even atheists are susceptible to irrational beliefs (Hood and Bloom, 2008; Hood, 2009; Frazier et al, 2009). Human irrationality is amplified when inserted into a system of religion that provides a supporting rationale for transcendental feelings that are difficult to articulate. For example, without an understanding of brain function, someone experiencing bliss during prayer will use their prefrontal cortex to translate this feeling within the context of the most rational explanation available to them, even if that explanation relies on religious dogma. As a result, proof for the dogma is sought and found in the feeling of transcendence itself. This is thought to explain why objects such as pretzels, burnt cheese sandwiches and iron heating filaments can become reverential subjects when they assume shapes similar to religious icons (USA Today, 2006; The Daily Telegraph, 2009). It also explains why those who disrespect or desecrate religious icons are frequently subject to death threats (e.g. FOX 35 NEWS, 2008). At a minimum, it is reasonable to conclude that there are conceivable and testable ways to show how spirituality became an important neurophysiological part of the human brain, as a result of natural selection. It is not the purpose of this article to defend this view. Rather, the aim is to explore the socio-political implications if it were assumed to be true and to assess which types of current religious criticism, if any, are valid approaches to creating a desirable state for society.   6 157  158  159  160  161  162  163  164  165  166  167  168  169  170  171  172  173  174  175  176  177  178  3. Current atheistic attacks on faith and religion Today atheists1 attack faith and religion in two central ways. 1) Through logical arguments and criticism regarding the rationality of various metaphysical claims and the truth of Holy Scripture 2) By arguing that overall organized religion is dangerous to humanity by pointing out past and present atrocities undertaken by religious communities. Although these argument are by no means new (e.g. Epicurus 341–270 BC; Descartes, 1663; Spinoza, 1670, Paine, 1794; Hume, 1779; Mencken 1930; Russell 1957) the attacks are taking place against a backdrop of increasing secularization within developed and emerging economies of the world and within a hyper-connected society facilitated by the internet. It is therefore difficult to predict how successful or unsuccessful atheists will be. Certainly it would be a mistaken to look at the centuries of failed religious criticism and conclude from this that atheists will therefore fail again in the 21st Century. But fail to do what exactly? Atheists are far from agreed as to what their ultimate goal would be. The four main figures of the new atheist movement, Richard Dawkins, Daniel C. Dennett, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens disagree significantly regarding this issue. For the purposes of this article it will be convenient to consider what each of these atheist commentators suggest should be the way forward. A cursory search through various websites and blogs shows that today most atheists fall into one of the schools of thought espoused by these individuals. Assessing the stance of each will therefore provide a broad insight into the principle ways atheism engages with religion today. Below a distillation below of what the 178  It should be noted that many, if not most atheists do not openly attack religion. Therefore the ‘atheists’ that are referred to in this article is confined to those who are outspoken in their opposition to religion or any unsubstantiated metaphysical claim.    7 1 179  180  181  182  183  184  185  186  187  188  189  190  191  192  193  194  195  196  197  198  199  200  201  202  203  204  author perceives are the main points of disagreement and divergences between these individuals. It is important to note that over the course of last 3-4 years (the duration of the current atheist wave) the opinions of Dawkins, Dennett, Harris and Hitchens have naturally varied in the face of debate and discussion. The summaries are therefore only intended to be generalizations that provide an overview of variations within the new atheist movement. Many forthcoming citations concern a round table discussion between the four men on the 30th September 2007, during which significant difference of opinion became apparent. This event was organised by the Richard Dawkins Foundation for Science and Reason, hence the reference given is RDFSR (2007). 3.1. Richard Dawkins Dawkins strongly rejects any form of faith-based belief. Whilst he feels that religion is a source of evil (Dawkins 2006b) he is more concerned with the truth of its metaphysical claims, a priority that is not clearly shared by the other 3 atheists. For example, Dawkins reflects: ‘…my concern is actually not so much with the evils of religion as whether it's true. And I really do care passionately about that… is there, as a matter of fact, a supernatural creator in this universe? And I really care about that.’ – RDFRS (2007) In his various books, Dawkins argues passionately that the real beauty of the universe is to be found in understanding its wonders (Dawkins 1998). In effect, Dawkins proposes that spiritual feelings of transcendence obtained within a religious context can easily be replaced by contemplating the universe within a scientific context. In contrast he frequently chides religion on explaining ‘…precisely nothing’ by invoking a supernatural creator and that this view is ‘parochial and cheapening’. He suggests that a strong aesthetic case could be made to ‘get rid’ of religion (RDFRS   8 205  206  207  208  209  210  211  212  213  214  215  216  217  218  219  220  221  222  223  224  225  226  227  228  229  230  2007). Dawkins has expressed the desire to live in a world where people ‘think skeptically for themselves and look at evidence’. 3.2. Daniel C. Dennett Dennett takes a strongly analytical approach to religion. Whilst believing that on balance the world would be better off without faith or religion he appears highly introspective and has expressed empathy with Muslims who feel the west has gone too far in its secularization and scientific understanding. Dennett ponders; ‘…the fact that something is true is not quite sufficient for spreading it about, or for trying to discover it…I think that we at least have to examine the proposition that there's such a thing as knowing more than is good for us… if you accept that so far, then a possibility we have to take seriously, even when we reject it, we should reject it having taken it seriously, is the Muslim idea that, indeed, the West has simply gone way too far, that there is knowledge that's not good for us, it's knowledge that we were better off without.’ - RDFRS (2007) In contrast to Dawkins’ zero-tolerance on faith or religion, Dennett has proposed a more strategic approach. ‘…instead of thinking about eradication [of religion], why not think about it the way an evolutionary epidemiologist would, and say what we want to do… is encourage the evolution of a virulence?… I find the superstition of astrology [to be] relatively harmless. If we could only…relegate [religion] to the status of astrology, I'd be happy!’ - RDFRS (2007) 3.3. Sam Harris Although in pitted debates with religious apologists it is not always clear, Harris appears to support a more nuanced engagement with religion that is selectively   9 231  232  233  234  235  236  237  238  239  240  241  242  243  244  245  246  247  248  249  250  251  252  253  254  255  256  critical of various faith systems (similar to Dennett epidemiological suggestion). He points out that ‘…once we focus on particulars, we have a real strength of numbers, and yet when we stand back from the ramparts of atheism and say it's all bogus, we lose 90 percent of our neighbors.’ - RDFRS (2007) As a neuroscientist he expresses a deep appreciation for spiritual experiences and frequently brings this up in debates and his books (Harris 2004, 2006). ‘I still use words like ‘spiritual’ and ‘mystical’ without furrowing my brow too much and, I admit, to the consternation of many atheists. I think there is a range of experience that is rare, and that is only talked about without obvious qualms in religious discourse.’ - RDFRS (2007). Although technically an atheist, Harris is uncomfortable with the label describing is as ‘…totally barren of content’, likening it to someone being labeled a ‘non-astrologer’. In a speech to the Atheist Alliance International conference in 2007 he choose to spend his hour long address upsetting most people in the room by listing reasons for why adopting the word ‘atheist’ is wrong and actually handicaps the engagement of the faith community (AAI 2007). This is in stark contrast to the RDFRS who sell t-shirts and other memorabilia emblazoned with the letter ‘A’ for atheist. Perhaps for this reason Harris has formed a new group called ‘The Reason Project’ which is mostly concerned with deconstructing religious dogma and scripture. Harris strongly believes it is possible to argue someone out of his or her beliefs using reason. ‘I'm constantly getting e-mail from people who have lost their faith and in effect been argued out of it.’ – RDFSR (2007).   10 257  258  259  260  261  262  263  264  265  266  267  268  269  270  271  272  273  274  275  276  277  278  279  280  281  282  3.4. Christopher Hitchens Hitchens, author of ‘God is Not Great’ takes a highly polemic view against religion, which frequently hides a more considered opinion. Asked why he takes this approach given that it alienates so many religious people he responded ‘…it’s just the way I am… I am a polemicist …one has to get people’s attention first… One can’t write a book saying God is not that brilliant.’ (Hewitt 2007). He argues that polemics have been successful in the past, citing to H.L. Mencken’s Treatise on the Gods (1930). Hitchens values modesty and even chastised Dennett and Dawkins for ‘…their cringe making proposal to conceitedly nominated themselves as brights’ (Hitchens 2007). Considering religion to be the beginning and end of all philosophical discussion, he relishes the dialectic nature of metaphysical discourse much more than his fellow atheists. For example, contrary to most atheists he considers the argument ‘that the likelihood a religious claim could have been made up is diminished by the incredibility of it, is a debate perfectly well worth having’. Hitchens suggests religion is ‘ineradicable’ due to the fact that humans are only partly rational. He also openly admits to contradicting himself about whether he wants to see an end to religion: ‘They’d be doing themselves and me a favour if they gave it up (people who practice religion). So, perhaps in that sense, I contradict myself. I mean, I wish they would stop it, but then I would be left with no one to argue with.’ RDFRS (2007). Hitchens believes that all religion is latently dangerous ‘…because of the surrender of the mind. The eagerness to discard the only thing that we've got that makes us higher primates, the faculty of reason. That's always deadly.’ RDFRS (2007). Given his enthusiasm for debating it would appear he is generally in favour of dialogue with moderate believers, warmly thanking all the USA Bible Belt colleges for inviting him to hear his ‘abusive hospitality’ (WTS, 2009). However he sees no   11 283  284  285  286  287  288  289  290  291  292  293  294  295  296  297  298  299  300  301  302  303  304  305  306  307  room for engagement with religious extremists such as suicide bombers and decries the lack of support from fellow atheists and secularists in calling for the ‘complete destruction of the Jihadist forces’. RDFRS (2007). Dennett said at this time that this was because ‘…we find the idea of exterminating these people just abhorrent.’ Table 1 summarizes the main areas of divergence amongst the new atheists by constructing a series of affirmative statements. Some atheists may regard some propositions more strongly than other. Nevertheless, to keep author bias to a minimum, degrees of agreement are resolved as coarsely as possible. Responses are thus given as agree, disagree or ambiguous. 4. Discussion 4.1. The efficacy of blanket attacks on religion Spatial variations in culture and individual variations in neurophysiology are likely to influence the susceptibility of a religious person to the arguments of atheists. This is why Sam Harris is correct to observe that people can be ‘argued out’ of a religions belief. However, those people who loose their faith as a result of debate and logical argument will necessarily be those who either wear their faith lightly or have a higher neural plasticity to incoming conflicting information. For example, someone who is raised religious but who has higher baseline anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) activity will probably be more inclined to recognize and act upon logical discrepancies pointed out by an atheist. This has far-reaching implications for the way atheists engage with religious people. Assuming atheists are successful in eroding the faith of believers the net affect would be a winnowing away of religious moderates to agnostic or atheistic positions. Consequently the remaining religious communities would become more homogenized in the type of people they represent.   12 308  309  310  311  312  313  314  315  316  317  318  319  320  321  322  323  324  325  326  327  328  329  330  331  332  333  Fig. 2a illustrates this phenomenon in a highly simplified form. The blocks numbered 1 to 6 represent the spread religious convictions held within a given faithbased community (1, weak to 6, strong). The average value of the first row includes all the blocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 giving an average religious conviction of 3.5 for that row. After a community’s encounter with atheism those with a religious conviction value of 1 will be most likely to be removed from the community resulting in an increase in the average conviction level of the second row to a value of 4. This means that in order for atheists to be successful again in removing a block they must overcome a higher religious conviction. The value rises after successive removals so that when 5 blocks are removed the religious conviction stands at 6. It can be safely assumed that an attack will not decrease the conviction of the entire group as those remaining members will have a higher degree of solidarity due to increase homogenization. This is an unrealistic model for a variety of reason, not least because it ignores evidence that suggests that attack actually enhances religious conviction. Biologically, the homogenized religious group would have lower baseline ACC activity combined with higher anterior insula activation, the latter of which has been isolated to pre-empt negative responses to cognitive dissonance (van Veen et al., 2009). As a result such people would be less amenable to argumentation and more likely to harbour out-group animosity (Inzlicht et al., 2008). Amygdala activation and serotonin suppression is higher between members of differing groups. This results in negative moods states which are thus attributed by the prefrontal cortex of the believer to the out-group perturbation leading to in the development of feelings such as fear and anger (Phan and Taylor, 2004; Wheeler and Fiske, 2005; Ronquillo et al., 2007). It has recently also been discovered that even visual representations of out-group individuals received by the visual cortex of in-group members are negatively altered according to the individuals preconceptions (i.e. the person of an opposing group looks less   13 334  335  336  337  338  339  340  341  342  343  344  345  346  347  348  349  350  351  352  353  354  355  356  357  358  attractive; Caruso et al., 2009). This process is known as subliminal priming (e.g. Lodge et al. 2003). The net effect of all these processes is that an attack on religion, not only increases the average baseline religious conviction, but also results in a strengthening of in-group solidarity and conviction. Few studies have been carried out that actually quantify the strengthening in religious conviction and due to attack. McGregor et al. (2008) saw a 30% increase in the belief of holy war to defend their beliefs depending on whether the candidates had been made to feel uncertain before the answering the relevant question. For our model in Fig. 2, this represents a feedback that works strongly against the religious winnowing process (i.e. the more the community is attacked the harder it becomes to successfully attack it). If it is assumed that atheists correspondingly step up their attack to convert religious community members to atheism the remaining body of believers will exponentially grow in their conviction (Fig. 2b). Naturally, some beliefsystems may possess doctrines that are in broad concordance with secular values. In that case the degree of conflict is decreased and the negative feedback lessened. Fig. 3 displays three feedback forces for three hypothetic belief-systems that generate reinforcements of 0% (simple winnowing as in Fig. 2a), 30% (uncertainty reinforcement McGregor et al. 2008) and 60% (a hypothetic extreme). In short, a blanket attack on religion would amount to a neurochemical selective pressure that would very likely lead to enhanced religious zeal, polarization and hostility. Needless to say this would hamper the ability to undertake a constructive dialogue. Quite the opposite from decreasing religious extremism, it would likely foster it, leading to an escalation in tension. This is an undesirable outcome if only because there is no way of knowing how this spiralling animosity would end.   14 359  360  361  362  363  364  365  366  367  368  369  370  371  372  373  374  375  376  377  378  379  Consequently the position of atheists who wish to treat all religions equally by purely attacking irrationality (e.g. Richard Dawkins), would appear untenable for generating a long-term constructive, much less persuasive, dialogue. The desire to live in a world without religion is probably not attainable through attacking faith due to ingroup out-group reinforcements as well as the biological predispositions outlined in the introduction. 4.2. Selective criticism The approach that has been advocated at least some of the time by atheists, such as Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris, includes the redressing of more pernicious forms of faith-based practices. These activities comprise a spectrum of behaviour such as proselytizing (especially to children), interference in a countries political system, the recourse to faith in order to claim moral superiority, female genital mutilation and suicide bombing. In this strategy, other beliefs and practices that are not deemed to be imminently harmful society would be left alone. These may include hermetically sealed dogmas1 such as the virgin birth, astrology, tarot card reading, and selfflagellation. This seems an eminently reasonable way forward, but its success is again limited by the method of pursuing the goal. The individuals who comprise groups that conduct activities that are deemed harmful to society are also less likely to be amenable to reason, if only because the strength of incoming out-group attack is 379  has been noted by Sam Harris that there is no way of knowing how dangerous a given dogma is in the long-term (RDFRS, 2007). By way of demonstrating this he cites the Catholic dogma that the soul enters the zygote at the moment of conception. This was a completely harmless dogma until stem-cell research was invented. At that point the dogma held by many Catholic politicians stood in the way of creating cures for many hitherto untreatable diseases.   15 1 It 380  381  382  383  384  385  386  387  388  389  390  391  392  393  394  395  396  397  398  399  400  401  402  403  404  405  higher than for more moderate religious groups thereby causing a negative feedback that strengthens conviction. Furthermore, the pre-existing disparity between societal norms and the practices of that religion also make it likely that the in-group spread of conviction (i.e. first row of numbers in Fig. 2) could be changed to 6-12 (instead of 16) giving an starting average religious conviction of 10.5. This would instantly make dealing with such people problematic. Therefore, although it is desirable to reduce harmful religious practices, pointing to internal contradictions or directly criticising the faith will be an ineffective strategy of reaching that goal. 5. Implications for the atheist dialogue Christopher Hitchens deserves considerable credit being for only member of the new atheists who is not a scientist but realises nonetheless that religion and faith are ‘ineradicable’. Given the positive feedback reinforcements discussed above, Hitchens is also mostly correct that all religions are latently dangerous. As he suggests, the certainty tremendously evens out that over space and time a given religion might become dangerous (RDFRS, 2007). How then, do we live with something that is ineradicable and yet latently dangerous? Although the answer to this question is extremely complicated, we are here primarily concerned with what atheists could do in light of social-psychological and neurological science. Below some adjustments are suggested for the atheist dialogue that may generate a more harmonious relationship with religion and faith. 5.1. Labelling The effect of labelling is well known to influence behaviour within competitive human situations (e.g. Lodge et al. 2003; Leech et al. 2008). Verbal and   16 406  407  408  409  410  411  412  413  414  415  416  417  418  419  420  421  422  423  424  425  426  427  428  429  430  431  visual labels, such as ‘atheist’ create neurological anchor points in the brain around which ideas can be consolidated and identities established (e.g. Kam, 2007). Withincategory self-labelling is strongly correlated with enhanced activity within the fusiform gyrus, prompting dopamine production, a powerful in-group solidarity reinforcer that can even override common racial stereotyping biases (van Bavel and Cunningham, 2008). In other words, someone who harbours negative feelings towards black people may become friends with one if they both belong to the same group. Thus acceptance and use of the word ‘atheist’ will enhance in-group solidarity within the atheist community but unconsciously precipitate out-group disparity and negativity. Harris et al. (2009b) notice that dopamine receptors in the ventral striatum are more active with the brains of atheists when they criticise religion suggesting they enjoy doing so. With labelling and the consequent solidarity that it brings, this dopaminergic reward pathway would likely become enhanced over time. Conversely the word ‘atheist’ provides a convenient negative anchor point for religious communities to attribute and direct stereotypes and animosity. Therefore Sam Harris’ suggestion that atheists should drop the label in order to effectively communicate with religious communities is highly appropriate, and justified, not only for the reasons he gives personally but also on the basis of current social psychological and neurological research. 5.2. Stereotyping, Confirmation Bias and Communication The generalizations that lead to stereotyping arise from the pattern seeking nature of humans. For example, the rains come in the summer, other tribes want our land, white men are not to be trusted were all helpful generalization that doubtless saved lives. However, in the modern world the choice to invest differentially in ingroup relationships rather than forming external ties produces a relative lack of   17 432  433  434  435  436  437  438  439  440  441  442  443  444  445  446  447  448  449  450  451  452  453  454  455  456  457  information regarding the out-group (e.g. Heckathorn and Rosenstein, 2002). Overgeneralization and aggression is particularly common when made anonymously. This is important because a great deal of the discussion within the atheist community is carried within Internet discussion forums (Sia et al. 2002). As already described, the human brain rewards with dopamine the conscious criticism or rejection of statements that contradict firmly held beliefs, such as ‘Jesus was not born of a virgin’. Thus in the context of online forums and blogs, negative sentiments and confirmation biasing (see Lord et al. 1979; Nickerson, 1998) would become especially prevalent and the resulting enhancement in solidarity leading to opposing view points being muted or ridiculed. The reaction of religious people to criticism also is also frequently judged to confirm the common atheist assertion that religious people are bumbling, belligerent or self-righteous. This may be due in part to the aforementioned biological origins to religious hyper-offense taking. However, it is well know that people who are subject to stereotyping experience a reduction in executive resources and are therefore more prone to handling negative emotions poorly (e.g. Steele et al. 2002; Johns et al. 2008). Therefore asserting generalizations upon a religious person leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy and an enhancement of a confirmation bias on the part of the atheists (see Pinel, 2002). The best way of avoiding these problems is to become aware of them. The most effective way to do this would be to increase out-group dialogue. Unfortunately this seems rather low on the agenda of the atheist movement. Responding to criticism of an atheist bus campaign, Fred Edwards, the national director for the United Coalition of Reason said, “When we get push back [from the religious], it increases the news coverage and the publicity. As a result, our numbers grow." (Helfand, 2009). Although not the stated objective of the campaign, spending thousands of dollars to   18 458  459  460  461  462  463  464  465  466  467  468  469  470  471  472  473  474  475  476  477  478  479  480  481  482  provoking a reaction to grow numbers will increase in-group solidarity as well as outgroup disparity. To promote a dialogue and any compromise it may bring, inter-group dialogue is required. Any effort to enhance polarization will reduce dialogue and potential compromise whilst increasing stereotyping. 5.3. Changes in advertisement strategy Currently advertising campaigns run by atheist and humanist societies focus on the meta-physical aspects of religion. For example ‘There’s probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life’ (British Humanist Association) ‘No God…No Problem!’ (American Humanist Association, AHA) ‘Why believe in a God? Just be good for goodness' sake.’ (AHA) ‘In the beginning, man created God’ (Indiana Atheist Bus Campaign). The goals of these campaigns are to encourage people to think critically and to challenge the privileged positions religious institutions hold in society. There is good reason to believe that the majority of religious people would support either or both of these propositions. For example in 2001 60% of Americans were concerned that religious groups funded with public money would proselytize to recipients of social services. In 2002 a Pew Poll in the USA found that 70% of people thought that the church should stay out of political campaigns. Even the majority of white evangelicals thought it would be wrong for their church to endorse a candidate. Similar polls have been carried out in 2006 and 2008 that show the same thing (AUSCS, online; Kuhn, 2009). However, an atheist campaign that locates the emphasis on the meta-physical (i.e. God) immediately excludes many people who would otherwise support the goals   19 483  484  485  486  487  488  489  490  491  492  493  494  495  496  497  498  499  500  501  502  (e.g. thinking critically). This diminishes the tide of potential public support and correspondingly decreases the power of political persuasion. Wording, therefore, becomes critical. Drawing attention to critical thinking could be done by other means, for example by highlighting problems caused by sloppy thinking or simply promoting critical thinking for its own sake. Alone, this approach may draw people away from a faith without the attack feedback that enhances faith conviction. 5.4. State-run churches and promoting religious pluralism It has been repeatedly demonstrated that increasing religious diversity, even in countries as secular as Sweden, positively correlates with all levels of religious piety (e.g. frequency of prayer, confidence in religion) (Hamberg and Pettersson, 1994; Iannaccone, 1998). This relationship replicated in studies that used data collected as far back as the mid-19th Century (e.g. Finke et al. 1996). Indeed, in 1776 Adam Smith saw the financial pragmatism innate in church life when he observed that deregulation of churches always caused an increase in their ‘exertion, their zeal and industry’ (Smith, 1776[1998] pp 437). This is probably why the USA is one of the most religious countries in the world. Conversely, the maintenance of a state-run church is understood to be part of the reason why Scandinavian countries as well as Great Britain are the most irreligious countries in Europe1. Fig. 4 illustrates this by plotting 502  Countries with state-established churches should not be confused with countries where the state is the church (e.g. Iran). Theocracies have a very high level of religious homogenization but also of professed belief due to the social-exclusion that comes with choosing a faith contrary to the theocracy. Conversely, some religions, although not part of the government, exert a strong control over the political process (e.g. The Philippines). Thus, the relation between state and church in this discussion is restricted to the states involvement in the church and not visa-versa.   20 1 503  504  505  506  507  508  509  510  511  512  513  514  515  516  517  518  519  520  521  522  523  524  a ‘Protestant concentration index’ (a measure of religious homogeneity) versus weekly church attendance. Naturally, historical and socio-economic considerations make the relationship between diversity and piety much more complicated. Nevertheless atheists who are opposed to state-involvement of churches may find the situation even more undesirable if the churches were forced to seek other means of financing. Although it would appear counterintuitive, increasing state financing and regulation of one organized religion would probably cause a large decline in national religiosity. This is for two major reasons. 1) Regulation would strictly limit the income of churches from private sources 2) A state regulatory umbrella would encourage diversity and consequently in-group heterogeneity leading to a decrease in the average religious conviction of the congregation, causing many to fall away to more agnostic or atheistic positions. In order to relegate the influence of religion in the public square in countries with a diversity of religious belief, atheists and humanists would be advised to campaign for a high degree of religious pluralism1 through activities such as interfaith dialogue. The congenial nature of these events sideline meta-physical differences in belief and foster working initiatives designed to aid local communities. The involvement of non-believers within in this process would be a highly beneficial to the entire humanist movement for at least three reasons. 1) It would contradict common prejudices held by religious people that atheists are immoral or seek to divide. Eroding this misunderstanding by actually orchestrating inter-faith dialogues 524  Here the term religious pluralism is being used in its ecumenical sense: i.e., the promotion of unity, co-operation, and improved understanding between different religions as well as the concept that two or more religions with mutually exclusive truth claims are equally valid.   21 1 525  526  527  528  529  530  531  532  533  534  535  536  537  538  539  540  541  542  543  544  545  546  547  548  549  550  would deconstruct defensive attitudes, and make religious communities more amenable to the concerns of secularists 2) Promoting dialogue between religions would increase inter-faith collaboration and decrease competition. As a result churches would spend less time proselytizing in the market place and more time in constructive partnerships. 3) Humanist involvement and oversight of inter-faith dialogues would ensure faith-based initiatives accorded with secular principles and were not being used to enhance any given religions influence on society. Although some religions, most notably Islam, largely reject the idea of religious pluralism (e.g. Mutahhari, 2006, p 33), this does not preclude the partaking of ecumenical behavior by these groups. For example, in a move that prompted calls from Al-Qaeda for his death, the king of Saudia Arabia initiated the first Muslim led interfaith dialogue in Madrid in 2008 (Sedarat, 2008). This meeting was also criticized by Amnesty International as hypocritical given his country’s record number of executions for religious offenses (Brinkley 2008). Despite this, most Rabbis in the United States and Israel warmly welcomed King Abdullah’s initiative saying this once in a lifetime opportunity for dialogue with perhaps the strictest Islamic theocracy in the world, must be seized (e.g. Rosen, 2008). It is therefore important to note that insurmountable theological differences are not necessarily barriers to a constructive dialogue that can reduce tension and actually benefit society. Rationalists may find this confusing. How can a religion claim that anyone who does not follow its teachings is doomed to spend an eternity in fire and yet happily sit down with other faith-groups and discuss commonalities? The reason is, again, probably due to the partly irrational state of the human mind. The unity and camaraderie that comes with fostering inter-religious dialogue probably enhances dopamine production and uptake. The lower background firing of the cingulated cortex, most common in religious people, would then become an advantage since   22 551  552  553  554  555  556  557  558  559  560  561  562  563  564  565  566  567  568  569  570  571  572  573  574  575  576  contradictory positions would more likely be overlooked. Given the accompanying higher levels of dopamine, larger differences in opinion would be less likely to cause defensiveness, allowing a constructive discourse to proceed. For this reason a high degree of pragmatism could be expected from such meetings. 5.5. Expounding scientific philosophy Many atheists suggest the level of educational attainment is inversely correlated to religiosity. Whilst this appears to be true for highly qualified scientists, for example within organisations such as the National Academy of Science where 72% are atheists (Larson and Witham, 1998) evidence for this relationship in less qualified people is highly ambiguous and in some cases even shows a positive correlation between education and religiosity (e.g. Ozorak, 1989; Iannaccone, 1998; Nolan, 2006; McCleary and Barro, 2006). Therefore, stating that religious people are only religious because they are uneducated is not only insulting, but also probably wrong. Even if it were correct, making such an observation would certainly cause a defensive reflex that would be unhelpful. A much more effective means of attracting the faithful would be to expound the findings and philosophies of science. Atheist such as Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins and have contributed greatly to this with books such as Wonderful Life and Unweaving the Rainbow respectively. Books that seek to promote a deep understanding and appreciation of the universe are also likely to have a winnowing effect on religious communities, but without the defensive recoiling that comes from direct religious criticism. Promoting uncertainty as a valuable way of thinking, without criticising organized religion (e.g. Pollak, 2003), will cause those with deep religious convictions to appreciate the modesty built into science, whilst possibly eroding the faith of those who are religious but then find that they enjoy critical thinking.   23 577  578  579  580  581  582  583  584  585  586  587  588  589  590  591  592  593  594  595  596  597  598  599  600  601  Continuing to focus on publishing such books would also help to dispel the notion that atheists are immune to transcendent experiences. In most of his books Richard Dawkins frequently expresses this spiritual sensibility. For example: ‘…that boy could have been me under the stars, dazzled by Orion, Cassiopeia and Ursa Major, tearful with the unheard music of the Milky Way, heady with the night scents of frangipani and trumpet flowers in an African garden… A quasi-mystical response to nature and the universe is common among scientists and rationalists.’ –Dawkins (2006, p 1). Most religious people probably never read this quote, taken from the God Delusion, because they found the book’s title instantly disagreeable. Therefore the most effective means of attracting people away from faith-based positions is the carrot of scientific philosophy, rather than the stick of reason. In should be noted, however that the efficacy of attracting religious people to atheism by highlighting the spiritual aspects of science will be neuropsyiologically limited to those with a brain that can accept and processes the uncertainty and conflicting information inherent in scientific endeavours. 5.6. A note on religious fundamentalism It is not the aim of this article to deal with the problems of religious extremism, currently most prevalent in parts of Islam. However atheists have used examples such as suicide bombing as evidence that with religion, anything can be justified (e.g. Dawkins, 2006b). Therefore it is important to briefly address this issue in the context of the atheist dialogue. Past or present, oppression and threat have always increased solidarity within the oppressed or threatened group. One could cite numerous examples from American   24 602  603  604  605  606  607  608  609  610  611  612  613  614  615  616  617  618  619  620  621  622  slavery, torture in East Timor to the reaction after 9/11 (Shelby, 2002; Landau et al. 2004; Li and Brewer, 2005; Stanley, 2008). A year after 9/11 it was noticed that the terrorist attacks may have revitalized a sense of American nationalism and democracy (Skocpol, 2002). In social psychological language, the out-group attack had reaffirmed in-group identities. In the Middle East most observers agree that the rise in modern Islamic resentment started with the Israeli occupation and escalated with the gradual encroachment of ideas, such as capitalism and women’s rights (e.g. Turner, 1974; Ahmad, 2004; Cantori et al. 2005; Tripp, 2006). Although the geo-political situation is decidedly more complicated than this, at the level of the human brain it is quite understable how decades of western advancement caused strong in-group out-group divides between Muslims who wanted to preserve their cultural identity and those who wish to profit from western investment. In effect, what Muslim’s perceived to be an erosion of their religion and values has created a feedback reinforcement of their religious convictions, similar to the higher values shown in Fig. 3. It is for this reason that only people with absolute religious conviction and thus belief in their infallibility could conceivably fly a plane into a building. Therefore whilst atheists correctly point out that metaphysical beliefs in martyrdom do not help to promote peace, it is clearly not the root of the problem1. Failure to vocalize the nuanced nature of this problem by painting things in the stark 622  A possible objection to this would be Sam Harris’ observation that metaphysical beliefs are evidently critical to how a religion responds to criticism. As a proof he cites Jainism, a religion that preachers utter non-violence. The more radical you become as a Jain, the less harmful you become (Harris, 2004; pp 147). Harris therefore maintains that Islamic fundamentalism is dangerous only because of the fundamentals of Islam. Be that as it may, this does not alter the fact that scriptural criticism of the Qur’an is unlikely to facilitate peace.   25 1 623  624  625  626  627  628  629  630  631  632  633  634  635  636  637  638  639  640  641  642  643  black and white terms of religious precepts has the effect of alienating moderate Muslim’s who may otherwise spend more time denouncing extremism. It also further reinforces Muslim fundamentalist convictions due to an already pronounced neuropsychological defensive feedback. Scriptural criticism of holy texts is critical if religion is to function in a progressive and pluralistic society. But as a remedy for stopping the spread of religious fundamentalism it is an ineffective tool. Religiosity and fatalism are highest amongst the poorest member of Muslim society1 (e.g. Hayati and Karami, 2005). It is also these groups who are widely known to be the largest recruitment pool for Islamic extremist groups (Fair, 2004). The most effective way humanists and atheists can curtail the spread of Islamic fundamentalism is to lobby all avenues of government that could lead to an improvement of the quality of life of the poorer members of Muslim society. 6. Conclusions Sigmund Freud described the basic concept of psychological repression. Commenting on unconscious processes he wrote: ‘The governing purpose obeyed by these primary processes is easy to recognize. It is described as the pleasure-unpleasure principle, or more shortly the pleasure principle. These processes strive towards gaining pleasure; [brain] activity draws back from any event which might arouse unpleasure. Here we have repression’ – Freud (1958[2003] pp 68) 643  Again, Sam Harris frequently counters by pointing out the 9/11 hijackers were highly educated, rich Saudi men who were not seeking a way out of poverty. However there is a widespread understanding that educated Saudi nationals are an exception and are widely sought after due to publicity they bring to recruit poorer individuals for suicide campaigns (Obaid and Cordesman, 2005; pp 9; Hegghammer, 2006).   26 1 644  645  646  647  648  649  650  651  652  653  654  655  656  657  658  659  660  661  662  663  664  665  666  667  668  669  50 years later, neuroscience is starting to uncover the neurochemical mechanisms for this withdrawal and offense-taking behaviour to criticism. Evidence from the fields of evolutionary psychology and neurology strongly suggest that humans are, to varying degrees, innately irrational and that religion is a predictable biproduct of this irrationality. If this is even partly true then it follows that humans would instinctively become defensive above and beyond what would normally be expected from the disagreements that arise during rational discourse. Discussions regarding matters of faith and religion therefore need to be conducted in a way that acknowledges this, otherwise polarization and religiosity are likely to become more prevalent and problematic. Within the current atheist movement a variety of strategies are being offered for the engagement of faith. These range from absolute rejection of anything unfounded on scientific evidence to selective criticism of more dangerous forms of belief. However, both strategies depend on criticizing faith claims, which in neurological terms would appear to be both ineffective and counter-productive. In light of this, atheists would be advised to readdress their priorities. A world without faith would only [possibly] come after enormous suffering. A world where faith and religious insights are welcomed but relegated to a level that they have a minimal impact on the political process is possible in most developed or democratic countries. Various strategy changes have been offered. 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Level of disagreement between groups in the ‘new atheist’ movement. Agreement or disagreement between groups is indicated; agree (y), disagree (n) and ambiguous (±). Affirmative Statement Homo-sapiens are partly irrational Spirituality is an important aspect of human nature Irrationality can and should be changed everywhere we find it All religions are equally false All religions are equally dangerous On balance religion and superstition have been bad for humanity The world today would be better off without faith or religion The term 'atheist' is useful and important Atheist group RD n ± y y ± y y y DD y y ± y n y y ± SH y y ± y n y y n CH y y y y y y ± ± 880  881  882  883    34 883  884  885  886  887  888  889  Fig. 2. Two scenarios for the process of religious winnowing. 2a) No reinforcement: removal of those with weaker faith leads to an overall increase in the average religious conviction of the remaining group. 2b) 30% feedback reinforcement, whereby for each block lost the remaining spread of religious conviction increases by 30% consecutively creating an exponential growth in conviction. See text for details.   35 889  890  891  892  893  894  895  Fig. 3. Average religious conviction feedbacks of 0%, 30% and 60% over a 6 step winnowing process. Each step is more difficult that the previous as the remaining community has neurologies less amenable to argument whilst in-group homogenization strengthens overall religious conviction. See text for details.   36 895  896  897  898  899  Fig. 4. Market concentration versus church attendance rates (adapted from Iannaccone, 1998). See text for details.   37